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Note
Copyrighting the Yellow Pages: Finding Originality
in Factual Compilations
Ethan L. Wood
Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 19761 ("the Act") par-
tially to expand and clarify the scope of copyrightable subject
matter.2 The Act, however, seems to contain an "undeniable
tension": although copyright law does not protect facts, it some-
times protects arrangements of facts.3 Nowhere is this tension
more apparent than in the area of factual compilations, such as
directories and maps. The federal courts of appeals historically
used conflicting approaches in granting copyright protection to
factual compilations.4 Some courts rewarded the efforts of the
compiler, 5 while other courts required that the compiler demon-
strate originality in the selection or arrangement of the
compilation. 6
In Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 7 a
copyright infringement suit involving a white pages directory,
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
2. See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative
History, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 857 (1987) (discussing the legislative history of the
1976 Copyright Act and judicial interpretation of the Act); Jessica Litman,
Copyright Legislation and Legislative Change, 68 OR. L. REv. 275 (1989) (dis-
cussing the history of copyright law and its ability to adapt to evolving techno-
logical advances).
3. See Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991);
see also 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988) (providing limited copyright protection to fac-
tual compilations). Historical accounts also present particular difficulties in de-
termining the extent of copyright. Copyright law protects the author's
expression of the facts in historical accounts, but does not protect the facts. See,
e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980) (dis-
cussing copyright protection for books speculating on the causes of the Hinden-
burg disaster), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
4. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two
most widely applied standards.
5. Courts usually refer to this type of protection as the "sweat of the brow"
approach. See infra note 20 (listing cases applying this approach).
6. See infra note 19 (listing cases using this approach).
7. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the law regarding copy-
right protection for factual compilations. The Feist decision,
however, has led to different interpretations of copyright protec-
tion for other types of factual compilations. Courts have applied
inconsistent standards when evaluating copyright protection for
yellow pages directories.8 Clarifying the appropriate standard
of protection is important not only to the yellow pages industry, 9
which exceeds eleven billion dollars in annual sales,' 0 but also
to other industries that produce factual compilations, particu-
larly the computer database industry.-"
This Note argues that denying copyright protection to the
arrangement and selection of compilations such as yellow pages
directories is inconsistent with Feist and other established copy-
right law. Part I discusses the Copyright Act, examines the
Supreme Court's guidelines for originality set forth in Feist, and
8. Compare BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info.
Publishing, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (finding no originality in a
yellow pages directory), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994) with Key Publica-
tions v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991) (find-
ing originality in the selection and arrangement of a yellow pages directory).
Although the courts in both BellSouth and Key Publications found no infringe-
ment of yellow pages directories, this Note argues that the two courts applied
inconsistent tests that will sometimes lead to different results. See discussion
infra part II.
The history of the BellSouth case provides a good illustration of the confu-
sion that Feist has engendered. Before the Feist decision, the district court
ruled in favor of BellSouth. BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Don-
nelley Info. Publishing, 719 F. Supp. 1551, 1569 (S.D. Fla. 1988). After the
Feist decision, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the district
court. 933 F.2d 952, 961 (11th Cir. 1991). The full Eleventh Circuit, however,
vacated the panel decision and granted rehearing en banc. 977 F.2d 1435 (11th
Cir. 1992). The en banc court then reversed the district court. 999 F.2d 1436
(11th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Fourjudges did not participate, id. at 1438, and one
judge strongly dissented, id. at 1471-85 (Hatchett, J. dissenting). The U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994); see also infra notes 59-
84 and accompanying text (discussing the BellSouth cases in more detail).
9. Industry has shown great interest in these cases. For instance, several
large corporations asked for leave to file as amicus curae in the petition for
certiorari in a recent yellow pages case. BellSouth Advertising & Publishing
Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994), denying cert. to 999
F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc). The denial of certiorari in that case had a
ripple effect: BellSouth subsequently dismissed a separate suit against another
competitor. BellSouth Corp. Drops Its Copyright Lawsuit, Telecomm. Alert,
Feb. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
10. Ann Woolner, Yellow Pages Decision Upholds Donnelley in Miami Case,
MrAMI DAILY Bus. REV., Sept. 15, 1993, at A3.
11. Revenues from online databases approached $9 billion in 1990, for ex-
ample. Philip H. Miller, Note, Life After Feist: Facts, the First Amendment,
and the Copyright Status of Automated Databases, 60 FoRDH~m L. REV. 507,
520 (1991).
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describes other relevant case law in the area of factual compila-
tions. Part II compares the two leading post-Feist cases involv-
ing yellow pages directories and demonstrates that the
approaches of the two cases may lead to inconsistent results.
Part III examines the advantages and disadvantages of the two
approaches and suggests the proper approach for protection of
yellow pages directories. This Note concludes that courts should
recognize that even "typical"'2 yellow pages directories and simi-
lar factual compilations may contain sufficient originality to
merit copyright protection.'3
I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR
FACTUAL COMPILATIONS
The Copyright Act specifically grants copyright protection
to compilations of fact, 14 but this protection extends only to the
"material contributed by the author of such work, as distin-
12. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh
Circuit's approach to an "entirely typical" yellow pages directory).
13. Other legal avenues besides copyright law could provide protection to
factual compilations. For instance, if a contractual relationship exists between
the provider and the user of an online database, the provider may have a cause
of action based on a breach of contract. See Paul T. Sheils & Robert Penchina,
What's All the Fuss About Feist? The Sky Is Not Falling on the Intellectual
Property Rights of Online Database Proprietors, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 563, 571-
78 (1992). State unfair competition laws also may provide remedies, to the ex-
tent that they are not preempted by congressional action. See id. at 579-84; see
also Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991) (indicat-
ing that unfair competition theories may provide protection under certain cir-
cumstances) (quoting 1 MEILVnL B. NnvmmR & DAvm NnSMER, NMJER ON
COPYRIGHT § 3.04 (1990)); Miller, supra note 11, at 525-27 (discussing protec-
tion under both contract and unfair competition).
Some commentators argue that Congress may be able to work around
Feist's constitutional mandate of originality in copyright by using its authority
under the Commerce Clause, if it so desires. See Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"?
Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural
Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338, 367-74 (1992); see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIM-
MR & DAVID NIMMER, NnmmR ON COPYRIGHT § 1.09 (1993) (discussing the
Commerce Clause as an alternative source of congressional power); Miller,
supra note 11, at 536-38 (supporting Professor Ginsburg's Commerce Clause
arguments).
14. A compilation is "a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). "A 'compilation' results from a process of
selecting, bringing together, organizing, and arranging previously existing ma-
terial of all kinds, regardless of whether the individual items in the material
have been or ever could have been subject to copyright." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670
[hereinafter HousE REPORT].
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guished from the preexisting material employed in the work."' 5
Thus, the Act seems inconsistent because it grants copyright
protection to compilations of fact while granting no protection to
facts.' 6 The court-created "merger doctrine" supplements these
provisions of the Copyright Act. Under this doctrine, a compila-
tion receives no protection if "there is only one or so few ways of
expressing an idea that protection of the expression would effec-
tively accord protection to the idea itself."' 7
A. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH
Historically, to determine whether a particular compilation
deserved copyright protection, courts applied one of two differ-
ent tests. Most courts, following the "creative selection ap-
proach," granted copyright protection only if the work contained
at least a small amount of originality in the selection or arrange-
ment of facts.' 8 Thus, under this approach, courts would not ex-
tend copyright protection to a compilation consisting only of a
mechanical listing of facts and the facts themselves would re-
main part of the public domain.' 9 In contrast, a minority of
courts followed the "sweat of the brow" theory and granted copy-
right protection to a compilation whose compiler had expended
effort in making it, even if neither the selection nor the arrange-
15. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988).
16. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. "Common sense tells us that 100 uncopyright-
able facts do not magically change their status when gathered together in one
place. Yet copyright law seems to contemplate that compilations that consist
exclusively of facts are potentially within its scope." Id.
Unfortunately, the legislative history does not provide much insight into
interpreting the Copyright Act. The House Report merely states that "[a] com-
pilation.., is copyrightable if it represents an 'original work of authorship' and
falls within one or more of the categories listed in section 102." HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 14, at 5670.
17. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991).
18. Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak Connec-
tion Between Copyright and the Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
1341, 1344 (1991). "Creative selection approach" is Professor Yen's term.
19. See, e.g., Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987)
(affirming the trial court's determination that Trivial Pursuit's use of the "fac-
tual content" of the plaintiffs trivia books was not infringement), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 977 (1988); Southwestern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Direc-
tory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801 (11th Cir. 1985) (using the "original work" stan-
dard to determine the Atlanta Yellow Pages met the originality requirements);
Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1984) (concluding
that the plaintiffs "exercised selection, creativity and judgment" in compiling
their pricing guide of baseball cards); Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650
F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that copyright protection for directories de-
pends on "originality" and the author's "industriousness" in distinguishing di-
rectories from the made-for-television movie at issue).
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ment of the compilation was original.20 The Supreme Court con-
sidered these conflicting approaches in Feist Publications v.
Rural Telephone Service Co.2 1
B. THE FEisr DECISION
In Feist, the plaintiff, Rural Telephone Services Company
("Rural"), published a telephone directory.22 A competitor, Feist
Publications, copied the listings from Rural's white pages, veri-
fied their accuracy, obtained additional information from tele-
phone customers, and published its own directory.2 3 Rural
brought suit, claiming copyright infringement.24 In its decision,
the Court considered the two traditionally competing theories. 25
20. Yen, supra note 18, at 1344-45; see, e.g., Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Frontier
Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985) (concluding that a local white pages
directory receives copyright protection because of the compiler's efforts of com-
piling the information).
Confusion over the "sweat of the brow" doctrine first arose from the Copy-
right Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 1-64, 35 Stat. 1076-1088 (1909) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). Because the 1909
Act was ambiguous and included the originality requirement only implicitly,
some courts incorrectly focused on the language in § 5(a), which listed factual
compilations as a category of protected works. Feist, 499 U.S. at 352. These
courts, erroneously interpreting § 5 as granting compilations copyright protec-
tion per se, without any requirement of originality, developed the "sweat of the
brow" theory to justify this protection. Id. at 352-53. Justice O'Connor quoted
the "classic formulation" of the theory: "[tihe right to copyright a book upon
which one has expended labor ... does not depend upon whether ... such
materials show literary skill or originality, either in thought or in language, or
anything more than industrious collection." Id. (quoting Jeweler's Circular Pub-
lishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259
U.S. 581 (1922)).
The "sweat of the brow" doctrine possesses "numerous flaws, the most glar-
ing being that it extended copyright protection beyond selection and arrange-
ment . . . to the facts themselves. . . . 'Sweat of the brow' courts thereby
eschewed the most fundamental axiom of copyright law-that no one may copy-
right facts or ideas." Id. at 353. Professor Nirnmer further criticized this
approach:
The desire of the courts ... to protect the industriousness of the re-
searcher is both understandable and in a sense commendable. It is
nonetheless incorrect; for those courts fail to apply the standard of
originality as it is understood in the law of copyright.... [T]o accord
copyright protection on this basis alone distorts basic copyright princi-
ples in that it creates a monopoly in public domain materials without
the necessary justifications of protecting and encouraging the creation
of "writing" by "authors."
1 NnMtR & NImMER, supra note 13, § 3.04[B]Il].
21. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
22. Id. at 342.
23. Id. at 342-43.
24. Id. at 344.
25. Id. at 344-61.
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The Court rejected the "sweat of the brow" theory, reasoning
that "originality, not 'sweat of the brow,' is the touchstone of
copyright protection."26 It held that even if Rural's directory as
a whole qualified for copyright protection,27 Feist's actions did
not constitute copyright infringement because Rural's directory
was not original. 28 The Court explained that despite the appar-
ent tension between copyright protection for facts and compila-
tions, copyright handles both in a consistent fashion:
Copyright treats facts and factual compilations in a wholly consistent
manner. Facts, whether alone or as part of a compilation, are not origi-
nal and therefore may not be copyrighted. A factual compilation is eli-
gible for copyright if it features an original selection or arrangement of
facts, but the copyright is limited to the particular selection or arrange-
ment. In no event may copyright extend to the facts themselves.
2 9
In justifying its decision, the Court went beyond the Copy-
right Act and further stated that "[o]riginality is a constitutional
requirement."30 The Court acknowledged Rural's substantial ef-
fort in compiling the directory, but explained that copyright re-
wards originality, not effort.3 1 The Court evaluated the various
components of the Rural white pages directory to determine
their originality. As a preliminary matter, the Court found that
the information in each listing was merely factual with nothing
26. Id. at 359-60.
27. The parties agreed that Rural's directory as a whole had a valid copy-
right, because it contained a foreword and original advertisements. Id. at 361.
28. Id. at 363-64.
29. Id. at 350-51.
30. Id. at 346. The Constitution grants Congress the power to "promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Commentators have questioned the Supreme Court's reasons for rooting its
decision in the Constitution, arguing that the Court should have based its deci-
sion on statutory considerations alone. See Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 341;
Paul J. Heald, The Vices of Originality, 1991 SuP. CT. REV. 143, 144 (noting that
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion "bludgeon[s] the [constitutional] point
home in at least seven places"); Robert A. Kress, Introduction, 17 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 323, 328-29 (1992). One commentator further argued that Feist is simply
confusing and hard to interpret. See Timothy Young, Note, Copyright Law:
Copyright Protection for Factual Compilations: The White Pages of the Phone
Book Are Not Original Enough to Be Copyrighted-But Why?-Feist Publica-
tions, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (interim ed. 1991), 17
U. DAYTON L. Rlv. 631, 660 (1992). But see David Lange, Sensing the Constitu-
tion In Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 367, 374 (1992) (praising Feist for signalling
"a new era of coherence in the constitutional law constraining intellectual prop-
erty"). These criticisms may be well-founded, but this Note assumes that Feist
will remain the law and deals with copyright principles within the context of
Feist.
31. Feist, 499 U.S. at 363-64.
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original warranting copyright protection.3 2 The Court then con-
sidered the selection, coordination, and arrangement of Rural's
white pages 33-elements that the Copyright Act specifically lists
as copyrightable.3 4 The Court found nothing original about se-
lecting the names, addresses, and phone numbers of subscribers
listed in the phone book.35 Similarly, the Court found no origi-
nality in the arrangement and coordination of the phone book
and noted that "there is nothing remotely creative about arrang-
ing names alphabetically in a white pages directory."3 6 Thus,
because the arrangement and selection of the directory lacked
originality, the Court held that those aspects of the directory did
not meet the minimum standards of originality necessary for
copyright protection.37 The Court noted, however, that "the
originality requirement is not particularly stringent. A compiler
may settle upon a selection or arrangement that others have
used; novelty is not required. Originality requires only that the
author make the selection or arrangement independently...
and that it display some minimal level of creativity."38 Accord-
ing to the Court, the white pages do not rise to even this mini-
mal level of originality.39
C. PROTECTION FOR THE YELLOW PAGES AFTER FEIST
Although Feist clarified the extent of copyright protection
for white pages listings, the decision left unanswered many
questions about the treatment afforded other factual compila-
tions, 40 including yellow pages directories.41 In Key Publica-
32. Id. at 361-63.
33. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361-62.
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); see also supra notes 14-16 and accompany-
ing text (discussing statutory protection for compilations).
35. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361-62.
36. Id. at 363.
37. Id. at 363-64.
38. Id. at 358.
39. Id. at 363-64.
40. The impact Feist will have on other types of factual compilations is still
unknown. Computer databases are clearly within the scope of copyright protec-
tion, because literary works are proper subject matter for copyright protection,
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (1988), and the term "literary works" includes "works,
other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or
numerical symbols ... , such as... film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they
are embodied." Id. § 101. This definition covers computer databases and pro-
grams. 1 NMMER & NIOMER, supra note 13, § 2.04[C]. One court has drawn a
clear distinction between the unoriginal arrangement of a white pages directory
and the original arrangement of a computer database. See Consearch, Inc. v.
Thomson & Thomson, 792 F. Supp. 305, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that the
computer database, "unlike the white pages of the telephone directory at issue
1994] 1325
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tions v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises,42 the Second
Circuit decided an infringement case involving a yellow pages
directory. The creator of the Key directory, Ms. Wang, had col-
lected business cards from businesses that she thought were of
particular interest to the Chinese-American community.43 She
sorted the information by type of business, placed each listing in
the appropriate category, listed the English and Chinese names,
addresses, and telephone numbers of the businesses, and pub-
lished a directory in 1989. 44 In 1990, the defendant published a
yellow pages directory (the "Galore directory") that was also of
particular interest to the Chinese-American community. 45 Ap-
proximately seventy-five percent of the listings in the Galore di-
in Feist," required "selection, coordination, arrangement, enhancement, and
programming... that establish the originality and requisite creativity").
Commentators disagree about the extent of protection for computer
databases. Some assert that Feist will only minimally affect databases:
"[C]ontrary to reports of its demise, copyright remains a vibrant source of pro-
tection for proprietors of online databases. Feist should not be read to declare
open hunting season on online databases; infringers should proceed at their
peril." Sheils & Penchina, supra note 13, at 571. Others feel that Feist leaves
databases virtually unprotected: "For proprietors of databases that are compi-
lations of factual material,... the copyrights [that] their databases are assur-
edly entitled to may offer only illusory protection.... Under the Supreme
Court's analysis, a competitor would be infi-inging no copyright if it simply stole
the data and left the base." Jessica Litman, After Feist, 17 U. DAYRON L. REv.
607, 609 (1992).
Decisions involving other forms of factual compilations have varied. For
example, the Second Circuit denied protection to a statistical chart listing data
concerning horse racing information, finding nothing original in the arrange-
ment or selection of the information. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700
(2d Cir. 1991). In contrast, the court did find sufficient originality in a blank
form containing different categories of baseball statistics. Victor Lalli Enters.
v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 1993). A determination of the
proper scope of copyright protection for the yellow pages would have an impact
on these and other types of factual compilations, as well.
41. See supra note 30 (listing sources critical of Feist).
42. 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991). The Second Circuit has traditionally been
the national leader in the development of copyright law. Leo J. Raskind, As-
sessing the Impact of Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 331, 338 (1992).
The Feist Court looked for originality during its infringement analysis, be-
cause Feist conceded Rural's directory as a whole deserved copyright protection.
499 U.S. at 361. The Key Publications court, by contrast, first looked for origi-
nality to determine whether Key had a valid copyright. 945 F.2d at 512-14.
Upon finding originality in the Key directory, the court then proceeded to ask
whether the Galore directory had copied any of the Key directory's original as-
pects. Id. at 514-16. In spite of this difference, the two courts used the same
test for originality.
43. Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 511.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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rectory had also appeared in the Key directory.46 The district
court found that the Galore directory infringed upon Key's
copyright. 7
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that certain aspects of
the Key directory were sufficiently original to qualify for copy-
right protection. Contending that the test of originality under
Feist was "not particularly rigorous,"48 the court found that Ms.
Wang had performed an original act of selection: she excluded
from her publication businesses that she believed would soon
close. According to the Second Circuit, this selection showed
sufficient thought and creativity to satisfy the Feist standard of
originality.49 Additionally, Ms. Wang selected businesses that
were of particular interest to the New York City Chinese-Ameri-
can community, another selective act the court deemed
original. 50
The court further held that when Ms. Wang divided the list-
ings into different business types she performed an original act
of arrangement. 51 Although the court found that some of the
categories were typical of any yellow pages listing, it reasoned
that others, such as "BEAN CURD & BEAN SPROUT SHOPS,"
were particularly relevant to the Chinese-American commu-
nity.52 Even if Ms. Wang had chosen only typical categories,
however, the court asserted that this fact would not preclude a
finding of originality.53 Additionally, the court found that the
arrangement was "in no sense mechanical, but involved creativ-
ity on the part of Ms. Wang in deciding which categories td in-
clude,"54 reasoning that both the Copyright Act and Feist
require originality and creativity, not novelty.55
The court concluded that Key Publications possessed a valid
copyright in its directory and that certain aspects of the direc-
46. Id.
47. Id. at 511-12.
48. Id. at 512.
49. Id. at 513.
50. Id.
51. The court carefully drew a distinction between deciding which catego-
ries to include and placing individual businesses within categories. Choosing
and naming categories was an original act, but placing each listing in a cate-
gory was "the sort of mechanical task that does not merit copyright protection."
Id. at 515.
52. Id. at 514.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-46
(1991).
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tory were original.56 To win an infringement suit, however, a
plaintiff must be able to show a "substantial similarity" between
the works. 57 Because the arrangement of the Galore directory
was not "even remotely similar" to the Key directory, and be-
cause the two directories contained only a small degree of dupli-
cation, the court held that the Galore directory did not infringe
the Key directory.58
At approximately the same time that the Second Circuit
heard Key Publications, the Eleventh Circuit also addressed the
issue of factual compilations in the context of the yellow pages.
In BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Infor-
mation Publishing,59 BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Cor-
56. The court acknowledged that the level of originality was not particu-
larly high, but the tasks of selection and arrangement "entailed the de minimis
thought needed to withstand the originality requirement." Key Publications,
945 F.2d at 514.
57. E.g., id.; Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863 (2d Cir. 1984).
The Second Circuit defined "substantial similarity" as "whether an average lay
observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the
copyrighted work." Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir.
1966).
The "substantial similarity" that supports an inference of copying sufficient
to establish infringement of a copyright is not a familiar concept to the public at
large. Rather, "[it is a term to be used in a courtroom to strike a delicate bal-
ance between the protection to which authors are entitled under an act of Con-
gress and the freedom that exists for all others to create their works outside the
area protected by infringement." Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
720 F.2d 231, 245 (2d Cir. 1983).
58. The court said that an exact replica clearly would have infringed the
Key directory, but copyright extends further than just an exact replica. Other-
wise, the court noted, an infringer could avoid the copyright by simply changing
one fact in the entire listing. Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 514.
Comparing the arrangement of the two directories, the court further noted
only three of the twenty-eight categories in Chinatown Today's directory dupli-
cated categories in Key's directory. The court did note that both directories
listed many of the businesses under similar categories (e.g. as "attorneys and
accountants" in the Chinatown Today directory and "attorney and law offices"
in the Key directory), but placing listings under categories was not a copyright-
able act. Finally, the court looked for a substantial similarity in the selection of
businesses listed. Only seventeen percent of Key's listings were present in the
Galore directory, and the listings that were included did not come primarily
from any one category of Key's directory. Thus, the court found that the listings
were not substantially similar. Id.
For these reasons, the court concluded that Chinatown Today's directory
did not infringe Key's directory. Id. at 515-16. To hold otherwise, the court
said, essentially would grant Key a monopoly on each of its listings. As long as
Chinatown Today used different principles of selection and arrangement, it was
entitled to copy the factual information from the Key directory. Id. at 516.
59. 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943
(1994).
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poration (BAPCO) published a yellow pages directory and gave
one free listing to every business-rate subscriber.60 After publi-
cation of the BAPCO directory, Donnelley Information
Publishing, Inc. and Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. (collectively
"Donnelley") marked each listing in the BAPCO directory with
codes that indicated the size and type of advertisement and
the line of business in which the subscriber engaged.61 Sub-
sequently, Donnelley developed a database containing
information about each subscriber.62  Relying on this
database, Donnelley contacted prospective customers and
solicited business for its own directory.63 BAPCO brought
suit for copyright infringement, and the district court
ruled in BAPCO's favor.64 A panel of the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision in a widely criticized65
60. Id. at 1438.
61. Id. at 1439.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1438-39.
64. BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publish-
ing, 719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1988), rev'd, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (en
banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994). The district court decision came three
years before the Supreme Court's decision in Feist.
65. Many commentators have criticized the panel decision in BellSouth for
being inconsistent with Feist, which the Court decided just a few months ear-
lier. See, e.g., 1 Nnmz & NInEa, supra note 13, § 3.04[B] n.53.1 (calling one
of the court's findings "ill-taken"); Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 352-53 (noting
that the court seems to have "sensed some weakness" in its own arguments);
Robert A. Gorman, The Feist Case: Reflections on a Pathbreaking Copyright
Decision, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TuC. L.J. 731, 753 (1992) (raising "some
doubt as to whether the Feist requirement of minimal creativity was satisfied"
in the panel decision); Raskind, supra note 42, at 331 n.3 ("[T]he court seems to
have cited Feist and otherwise ignored its reasoning."); Yen, supra note 18, at
1376 n.149 (calling the Eleventh Circuit's findings "rather questionable").
Many of the panel findings are questionable. For instance, the court said
that BAPCO had been original in selecting the geographic boundaries of its di-
rectory, selecting the closing date for listings in its directory, coordinating all
the information into one complete listing, and arranging the coordinated list-
ings into various categories. BellSouth, 933 F.2d at 957-58. It is difficult, how-
ever, to see how acts of selecting geographic boundaries, setting a closing date,
and coordinating the information are different from acts that are part of creat-
ing a white pages directory, yet such acts do not meet even the minimal level of
originality required for copyright protection. See Feist Publications v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). The Eleventh Circuit panel gave no
reason for making this distinction.
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opinion.66 On rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc
reversed the original panel decision.67
To determine whether Donnelley had infringed, 68 the en
banc panel considered which, if any, aspects of the BAPCO di-
66. BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publish-
ing, 933 F.2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated and reh'g en bane granted, 977 F.2d
1435 (11th Cir. 1992), rev'd on reh'g en bane, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994).
67. Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publish-
ing, 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (en bane), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994).
The lone dissenter in the en bane BellSouth decision, Judge Hatchett, was one
of the three judges who heard the original panel decision. He sharply criticized
the majority opinion:
The majority's holding establishes a rule of law that transforms the
multi-billion dollar classified publishing industry from a business re-
quiring the production of a useful directory based on multiple layers of
creative decision-making, into a business requiring no more than a
successful race to a data processing agency to copy another publisher's
copyrighted work-product. In reaching this incredible result, the ma-
jority forsakes thoughtful analysis of the evidence under the governing
principles articulated in Feist, and leaps to a conclusion based on noth-
ing more than its collective judgment of what ought to be
copyrightable.
Id. at 1471 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
Judge Hatchett agreed with the majority that acts of selecting geographic
boundaries and coordinating phone numbers with addresses and names are not
protected acts of selection. Id. at 1473. He argued, however, that choosing a
system of headings is an original act of selection. Additionally, he argued that
categorizing businesses under certain headings constitutes an original act of
arrangement, id. at 1474-75, and thus made an argument that Key Publications
rejected. Key Publications v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., 945 F.2d
509 515 (2d Cir. 1991). Moreover, he argued that BAPCO exercised original
selection and arrangement when it included only business rate customers and
choose the directory's geographic boundaries. BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1477-78
(Hatchett, J., dissenting).
Judge Hatchett also devoted several pages to detailing exactly how Donnel-
ley had copied listings from BAPCO's directory. Id. at 1479-85. It is difficult to
see why this discussion is relevant, because Donnelley did not contest the fact
that it had used BAPCO's directory in preparing its own. Because BAPCO
could show access, the only meaningful question was substantial similarity.
Judge Hatchett also contended that the majority had reached its decision
by considering evidence not presented to the district court. Id. at 1481 n.8. The
majority disagreed with this assertion. Id. at 1443 n.17 (opinion of the court).
68. The parties in the BellSouth cases stipulated that the BAPCO directory
as a whole was copyrightable. Consequently, the court moved directly to the
question of infringement. BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1440; 933 F.2d at 956. The
parties in Key Publications, discussed infra, made no such stipulation, so the
court first had to determine whether the directory deserved copyright protec-
tion. See Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 512-14. Despite this difference, the two
cases posed identical questions. In focusing on whether there was infringe-
ment, the court in the BellSouth cases asked the same questions of originality
that the Key Publications court answered before it reached the question of in-
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rectory were original.69 The court ruled that when BAPCO se-
lected a geographic scope, determined prospective customers,
and offered a number of free listings, it did not perform original
acts of selection.70 Instead, the court considered these acts to be
"techniques for discovering facts."71 According to the court,
under Feist, "[t]he protection of copyright must inhere in a cre-
atively original selection of facts to be reported and not in the
creative means used to discover those facts."72 Furthermore, the
court found no originality in the arrangement and coordination
of BAPCO's directory, concluding that the arrangement was "en-
tirely typical"73 of yellow pages listings, just as the white pages
listings at issue in Feist.74
The court held further that BAPCO's arrangement deserved
no protection under the merger doctrine,75 which denies copy-
right protection if there is only one way or are very few ways to
express an idea.7 6 Because BAPCO's arrangement was, for any
practical purpose, the only way to organize a useful business di-
rectory, the court held that it would be unfair to grant BAPCO
copyright protection for this arrangement.77
In addition to finding that the overall organization of the
directory lacked originality,78 the court concluded that nothing
in the coordination or arrangement of BAPCO's system of head-
ings was original. Even if Donnelley had copied the headings
from BAPCO's directory, the court ruled that selecting certain
business categories, such as "Attorneys" or "Banks," was so obvi-
ous that it lacked the originality necessary to qualify for copy-
right protection.79 BAPCO's choice of headings also failed under
the merger doctrine: the court held that the use of these head-
fringement. See supra note 42 (comparing the approaches of the courts in Feist
and Key Publications).
69. BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1441.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1442-43; see also Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (holding that arranging names alphabetically in the white
pages is "practically inevitable" and therefore deserves no copyright protection).
74. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 361.
75. BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1442.
76. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the merger
doctrine).
77. BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1442.
78. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (discussing the Feist
Court's creativity requirement for selection of facts).
79. BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1444.
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ings was essentially the only useful way to organize a yellow
pages directory.8 0
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit criticized the district court for
comparing the appearance of the Donnelley and BAPCO directo-
ries,81 concluding that similar appearance did not necessarily
imply that Donnelley had copied protected aspects.8 2 The court
recognized that the amount of information that Donnelley took
from the BAPCO directory was substantial "in a purely quanti-
tative sense" but contended that this fact alone did not mean
that Donnelley had copied the original aspects.8 3 Although the
court acknowledged that copying so much of the plaintiffs work
might seem unfair, it noted that in Feist the Court cautioned
that "[tihe primary objective of copyright is not to reward the
labor of authors," but to promote progress in science and the
arts.84
II. DISTINGUISHING THE SECOND AND ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT APPROACHES TO THE YELLOW PAGES
At first glance, it may appear that the two circuits in the
yellow pages cases arrived at the same decision: as long as a
competitor does not make an exact or very similar replica, it
may copy yellow pages listings without fear of infringement lia-
bility. A closer examination, however, reveals subtle but impor-
tant differences between the two approaches. Specifically, the
Second Circuit's test allows a finding of infringement in some
cases, even for a "typical" yellow pages listing.85 The Eleventh
Circuit's test, by contrast, is much more restrictive and recog-
nizes originality only in extremely limited circumstances, if at
all.86
A. THE SECOND CIRcuiT's APPROACH: THE "ORiGiNAL
ELEMENTS" TEST
Several factors in Key Publications indicate that the Second
Circuit is willing to find originality in directories, given the right
circumstances. In its analysis, the court carefully emphasized
80. Id.
81. The appendix to the court's opinion contains several pages comparing
the appearance of the Donnelley and BAPCO page formats. See id. at 1447-70.
82. Id. at 1445.
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
349 (1991)).
85. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
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the original elements of the directory, including the selection of
businesses Ms. Wang included and the arrangement of the di-
rectory into several different categories.8 7 Accordingly, the
court clearly indicated its willingness to find infringement even
in cases in which the defendant had not made an exact replica,
refusing to "read Feist in such a broad and self-defeating fash-
ion."88 The court contended that such limited protection is unac-
ceptable, concluding that although "'copyright in a factual
compilation is thin,' we do not believe it is anorexic."89 As an
example, the court noted that in the past, it had found infringe-
ment when an individual simply copied a selection of 5,000 "pre-
mium" baseball cards from a previously published directory.90
By focusing on particular elements of the directory, the Sec-
ond Circuit appears very willing to find protected aspects of orig-
inality in a yellow pages listing. The facts in Key Publications,
however, were simply not appropriate for the court to find in-
fringement, because the court held that the defendant's direc-
tory did not copy any original elements of the Key directory. 91 If
the defendant's directory had duplicated all the listings under
one category, for instance, the court indicated it would have
found infringement.92
B. THE ELEVENTH CIRcuir's APPROACH: TE "GENERAL
FORMAT" TEST
The Eleventh Circuit opinion in BellSouth is much more
hostile than Key Publications to claims of copyright infringe-
ment of the yellow pages. 93 Although the court did accept, for
purposes of the case, that the BAPCO directory as a whole is
87. Key Publications v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., 945 F.2d
509, 513-14 (2d Cir. 1991).
88. Id. at 514.
89. Id. (quoting Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
349 (1991)) (citation omitted).
90. Id. at 516 (citing Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir.
1984)).
91. "The selection of businesses for the [Galore directory was] significantly
different from the 1989-90 Directory." Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 516.
92. Id. at 517. This duplication occurred in Eckes. The essential factor was
that the 5,000 listings were the same 5,000 that were listed in the original
guide as "premium." This was enough to satisfy the substantial similarity test
for copyright infringement. Eckes, 736 F.2d at 863-64.
93. The court's opinion in BellSouth cited Key Publications only once, for a
discussion of the "substantial similarity" standard. See BellSouth Advertising
& Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publishing, 999 F.2d 1436, 1445 n.23 (en
banc), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994). The dissent, on the other hand, cited
Key Publications numerous times. See id. at 1471-85 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
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entitled to copyright protection,94 the court's opinion does not
specify which aspects of the directory it considered protected.
Rather, the court listed aspects of the directory that are not pro-
tected. For example, the court found no originality in BAPCO's
selection of businesses to include in the directory, because
BAPCO gave a free listing to every business-rate telephone cus-
tomer.95 The court failed to note, however, that BAPCO deliber-
ately chose to exclude residential rate customers, whereas
Donnelley did include such customers in its directory. 96 The
choice to exclude certain businesses may not seem particularly
creative. BAPCO's decision, however, contains as much a degree
of creativity as excluding businesses that would soon close-a
selection that the Second Circuit found worthy copyright protec-
tion in Key Publications.97
Finding no originality in the selection of businesses in the
BAPCO directory, the Eleventh Circuit turned to the issue of
original arrangement. 9s This analytical step marks the point at
which the approaches of the two circuits differ significantly. The
Eleventh Circuit, rather than focusing on the selection and ar-
rangement of the elements of the directory, concentrated on the
question of whether the general format of the directory was orig-
inal. The court found that BAPCO's heading structure, "an al-
phabetized list of business types, with individual businesses
listed in alphabetical order under the applicable headings," is
"entirely typical" and deserves no protection.99 In this respect,
the court's decision is similar to the treatment the Supreme
94. Id. at 1440 & n.11. Although the court did not explain exactly what it
meant by a valid copyright in the directory as a whole, it probably refers to the
same things that received undisputed copyright protection in Feist, such as a
foreword and original text within the advertising section. See supra note 27.
95. BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1441.
96. The dissent raised this point. Id. at 1476-77 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
For a summary of the dissenting opinion, see supra note 67.
97. Every business-rate telephone subscriber within the specified geo-
graphical boundaries received one free listing under the appropriate heading.
Each was then free to purchase additional listings under different headings or
advertisements to go along with its listings. BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1438. Be-
cause of the factual situation, it is impossible to know how the court would have
ruled if BellSouth had shown some discretion in choosing which businesses to
include.
98. Before discussing the arrangement of headings within the directory,
the court found that the arrangement of listings within each category was "en-
tirely typical." Id. at 1442. This is in accord with Key Publications, in which
the court said that arranging businesses under headings was mechanical and
not original. Key Publications v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., 945
F.2d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 1991).
99. BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1442 & n.13.
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Court afforded the white pages in Feist.'0° The court, however,
failed to also consider whether the specific arrangement of cate-
gories and headings within the general structure might be
original.
C. CONTRADICTIONS IN THE Two APPROACHES
The Eleventh Circuit's approach directly contradicts Key
Publications. The Second Circuit acknowledged that the format
of the Key directory was "common to most classified directo-
ries."' 0 ' The court did not focus, however, on the general for-
mat. Instead, the court was concerned only with finding
creativity in particular elements of the directory, such as the act
of deciding "which categories to include and under what
name."10 2 The Eleventh Circuit in BellSouth, by contrast, would
deny copyright protection to any arrangement of categories that
seemed "entirely typical of its respective type,"103 regardless of
how much creativity the compiler had demonstrated in selecting
or arranging certain information. 10 4
The Second Circuit and Eleventh Circuit tests, therefore,
differ significantly in their approaches to copyright protection
for yellow pages directories. The Second Circuit considers the
organization within specific elements of headings and busi-
nesses. 10 5 Its approach recognizes that if the compiler used cre-
ativity in selecting and organizing the directory, the
arrangement deserves copyright protection, even if the directory
is typical of its kind.'06 The Eleventh Circuit approach, in con-
trast, focuses on the overall organization of the directory, hold-
ing that listing businesses alphabetically under appropriate
business headings can never be original, regardless of how an
individual selected those headings and businesses. 0 7 In many
100. See Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361-64
(1991).
101. Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 514.
102. Id.
103. BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1443 (quotations omitted).
104. The court cited two other examples of listings that were typical of their
types. BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1442 n.13. One of those examples was an auto-
mobile catalog that listed replacement parts. Even though the catalogs were
arranged in three sections, the arrangement was obligatory for a parts catalog.
The court was not concerned with the arrangement of those three sections or
the businesses listed under them. Cooling Sys. & Flexibles v. Stuart Radiator,
777 F.2d 485, 492 (9th Cir. 1985).
105. See Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 513-14.
106. See id.
107. See BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1441-43.
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situations, of course, these tests will achieve identical results
and result in a finding of no infringement, which occurred in the
Key Publications and BellSouth cases.' 08
In a slightly different factual situation, however, the two ap-
proaches would reach opposite results. If, for example, the Ga-
lore directory had copied and used all of the Key directory
headings, the Second Circuit's original aspects test would most
likely have found infringement, because copyright law protected
Ms. Wang's original arrangement.' 0 9 She used creativity in
choosing which headings to include."i 0 Indeed, copyright law
would have protected the Key directory even if the two directo-
ries had not contained identical business listings."' The Second
Circuit would also likely have found infringement if the defend-
ant's directory had copied all of the listings under individual
headings."i 2 In contrast, under the Eleventh Circuit's general
format test, such an arrangement would be "entirely typical" for
a yellow pages listing and would deserve no copyright
protection." 3
As the above example shows, the two different approaches
can sometimes lead to different results. Because the two ap-
proaches may reach contradictory results, it is important to de-
termine which approach is most consistent with Feist and to
understand the implications of that approach to different types
of factual compilations.
III. RECOGNIZING ORIGINALITY IN
FACTUAL COMPILATIONS
A. PROBLEMS WITH B=ELSoInzs GENERAL FORMAT TEST
The Eleventh Circuit's BellSouth decision used a standard
of originality that is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ap-
proach in Feist. In Feist, although the Court denied copyright
protection to a white pages directory because it lacked original-
ity, the decision indicated that the required standard of original-
ity is quite low." 4 Most compilations would qualify for
108. Id. at 1446; Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 516-17.
109. See Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 514.
110. See id. at 513-14.
111. See id. at 514 (interpreting Feist to allow a finding of infringement even
without exact duplication); see also supra text accompanying note 88.
112. Key Publications, 945 at 516-17.
113. See BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1442 & n.13.
114. See Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358-59
(1991).
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copyright protection. 11 5 The white pages directory in Feist
failed because its arrangement was "entirely typical."1 6 Specif-
ically, the court stated that "there is nothing remotely creative
about arranging names alphabetically in a white pages direc-
tory. It is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition .... It
is not only unoriginal, it is practically inevitable.... [It] does not
possess the minimal creative spark required. ... "117
In BellSouth, the Eleventh Circuit, by interpreting Feist to
bar copyright protection for the selection and arrangement of a
yellow pages directory,"18 ignored the fact that the level of crea-
tivity that Feist required in a factual compilation is quite low
and that the arrangement and selection in a compilation need
not be novel.1 19 Although the general structures of most yellow
pages directories are similar, compiling a yellow pages directory
may involve several original acts that require more creativity
than the "entirely typical" compilation of a white pages direc-
tory. 120 A compiler of a white pages directory simply gathers
information from a geographical area and alphabetizes the data.
Although this task may require significant effort, it requires no
originality.12 1 The compiler of a yellow pages directory, by con-
trast, must make a number of original decisions, such as decid-
ing which businesses to include, which categories to use, how to
arrange the information, and how to present the information.' 22
The level of originality involved in these acts may not be ex-
tremely high, but, according to Feist, the level of originality and
creativity necessary for protection should be minimal.123
Thus, by requiring that a yellow pages directory be some-
how atypical or unlike other yellow pages directories, 2 4 the
Eleventh Circuit has raised the threshold of required originality
higher than the Feist decision established. Commentators agree
115. Id. Even if a compilation does receive copyright protection, however,
that protection is limited. Id. at 359.
116. Id. at 362.
117. Id. at 363.
118. See BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Pub-
lishing, 999 F.2d 1436, 1442 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (Hatchett, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 943 (1994).
119. See supra text accompanying note 38 (quoting Feists statement that
"the originality requirement is not particularly stringent").
120. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 362.
121. Id. at 363-64.
122. BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1472-77; Key Publications v. Chinatown Today
Publishing Enters., 945 F.2d 509, 513-14 (2d Cir. 1991).
123. Feist, 499 U.S. at 358-59.
124. See BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1442.
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that even a typical yellow pages directory deserves copyright
protection under Feist.125
The Eleventh Circuit test has other flaws, most notably, its
reliance on the merger doctrine.126 Under that doctrine, the
court feared that granting copyright protection to a particular
selection of headings in a yellow pages directory would prevent a
competitor from using the same headings. 127 The merger doc-
trine, however, does not apply, because there are many possible
selections of headings. The court's concern is misplaced. Grant-
ing copyright protection to a certain selection of headings would
not in any way prevent a competitor's use of a similar or even
identical headings, because "novelty is not required" for a fac-
tual compilation to receive copyright protection. 128 Copyright
law prevents copying, not independent creation; therefore, a
competitor would be free to use a similar or even identical head-
ings provided that it selected these headings itself, rather than
copying from the first directory. 29
Not only is the Eleventh Circuit's "originality" threshold im-
proper from a legal standpoint, but it also may create financial
disincentives to the creation of factual compilations.' 30 The
proper test for originality in factual compilations must protect
125. Professor Nimmer, on whom the Court relied heavily in Feist, took for
granted that yellow pages directories satisfy the minimal requirements of origi-
nality, even in light of Feist. "[Feist] does not bar copyright protection for tele-
phone book yellow pages, or even white pages that are selected, coordinated or
arranged in an original fashion." 1 NIMMR & NnuR, supra note 13, § 3.04[B]
(footnotes omitted); see also John P. MacDonald, The Search for Certainty, 17 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 521, 535 (1992) ("By using the correct analysis the Key [Publi-
cations] court rendered a result that conforms with the meaning of Feist.").
Professor Nimmer suggested two other examples that might meet the re-
quirement of originality: a list of the one hundred most important phone num-
bers in town, chosen and ordered in a particular way, and an alphabetical
listing of phone numbers relevant to operating a catering business. 1 NMMnER
& NMMER, supra note 13, § 3.04[B] n.54. It does indeed seem difficult to find a
meaningful distinction between those two examples and a "typical" yellow
pages directory.
126. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing principles of the
merger doctrine).
127. BellSouth, 999 F.2d at 1444.
128. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991); see
also Key Publications v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., 945 F.2d 509,
513 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that "originality is not synonymous with novelty").
129. Feist, 499 U.S. at 358; 1 NinmR & NnwER, supra note 13, § 2.01[B].
This is in contrast to patent law, in which a device infringes a patent even if the
second inventor had no knowledge that the device already existed. 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a) (1988).
130. See infra notes 140-145 and accompanying text (discussing economic
incentives for the creation of factual compilations).
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the original selection and arrangement of the fact but not the
facts themselves.131
B. THE SECOND CIRcuiT's ORIGINAL ELEMENTS APPROACH: A
BETTER ANALYSIS OF ORIGINALITY
The Second Circuit's test for originality in Key Publications
strikes the proper balance between protected and unprotected
aspects of a factual compilation. In essence, the Second Circuit
finds originality if a particular aspect of a factual compilation
exhibits a minimal amount of creativity.' 3 2 Such protection,
however, must necessarily be "thin"13 3 and covers only the selec-
tion and arrangement. 34 Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Sec-
ond Circuit, which has traditionally been the most influential in
developing copyright law,' 35 properly follows the Feist approach.
The court's analysis fits well with existing copyright
jurisprudence. 136
In its decision, the court recognized that although the crea-
tivity involved in the Key directory was minimal, it met the
copyright threshold requirement of originality.137 The Supreme
Court in Feist noted that novelty is not a requirement for origi-
nality and that a compiler could use a selection or arrangement
that others had used.138 Following Feist, the Key Publications
court appropriately looked for originality in the selection and ar-
rangement of aspects of the yellow pages directory within this
non-novel format.139
131. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 350-51.
132. Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 512-13.
133. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349.
134. Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 513.
135. Raskind, supra note 42, at 338. The Second Circuit was one of the first
circuits to use the "sweat of the brow" theory that Feist discarded. See Jeweler's
Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922). The Feist decision cited Jeweler's Circular as an
example of a case that applied the flawed "sweat of the brow" doctrine. Feist,
499 U.S. at 353. The Second Circuit, however, abandoned the doctrine several
years before the Feist decision. See Rosemont Enterps., Inc. v. Random House,
Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
Subsequent Second Circuit decisions have applied the correct standard. See,
e.g., Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that
the Second Circuit has been "particularly restrictive" in granting copyright pro-
tection based solely on the compiler's efforts).
136. See supra note 125 (discussing commentators, including Nimmer, who
support the Key Publications approach).
137. Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 514.
138. Feist, 499 U.S. at 357.
139. Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 513-14.
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In addition to being superior from a legal standpoint, the
Second Circuit test is preferable from an economic stand-
point.140 Because the purpose of copyright law is to promote the
creation of beneficial works,141 the law should provide incentives
to create useful factual compilations. 142 If competitors can copy
an entire compilation, they may receive a "free ride" and profit
from the creator's work.' 43 Free riders may discourage creation
of factual compilations because these imitators have lower costs
and are able to charge less for their products.'" By offering
greater protection to factual compilations, the Second Circuit's
broader approach to originality helps to provide the necessary
incentives. 145
The yellow pages provide a good illustration of these incen-
tives. The first creator of a yellow pages directory gathers infor-
mation about potential customers, solicits business, chooses
categories, places businesses in categories, and arranges the di-
rectory in what the creator feels is an appropriate manner. 4 6
Without any type of protection for the original work, a competi-
tor would be free to enter the same market, use the same catego-
ries and arrangement, and essentially copy the original
directory, saving time and money because of the original com-
piler's work. Because the original compiler has spent more
money to create its directory, the second compiler has lower
140. The "sweat of the brow" approach would also offer economic incentives
to creators of factual compilations. That approach, however, goes too far, be-
cause it protects the facts themselves, which the Copyright Act does not permit.
See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text
(discussing and criticizing the "sweat of the brow" approach).
141. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
142. Copyright does have its limits, though. Other avenues may be avail-
able to protect factual compilations. See supra note 13.
143. See generally Yen, supra note 18, at 1364-75 (discussing the free rider
problem). Professor Yen ultimately concluded that the creative selection ap-
proach does not provide the necessary incentive for creation of factual compila-
tions and suggested a dramatic restructuring of copyright law. Id. at 1375-78.
Discussion of such a proposal is outside the scope of this Note.
144. See id. at 1364-75.
145. See generally Dennis S. Kaijala, Copyright and Misappropriation, 17
U. DAYTON L. REv. 885 (1992) (encouraging a permissive interpretation of the
originality requirement to encourage the creation different types of useful
works).
146. Of course, gathering business and soliciting customers, in and of them-
selves, are not protected activities. These activities could only receive protec-
tion under the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, which the Court discarded in Feist.
See Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353-54 (1991); see
also supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing the "sweat of the brow"
doctrine and discussing its flaws).
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costs and is able to undercut the price of the first compiler. This
punishes the first compiler and discourages it from creating the
work.147
If the arrangement of the first directory receives copyright
protection, the competitor may still use the facts contained in
the original directory, of course, because facts are not copyright-
able. 148 The arrangement and selection of the directory, how-
ever, do receive protection, 14 9 which would prevent the
competitor from copying those aspects. This protection would
increase the competitor's expenses and reduce the cost disparity
between the original compiler and the competitor, thus provid-
ing more incentive for the creation of compilations. 150
147. Cf Kaijala, supra note 145, at 926-28 (encouraging an extension of
legal protection for works subject to piracy to encourage production of such
works).
148. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
149. Feist, 499 U.S. at 350.
150. Although the Key Publications and BellSouth cases deal specifically
with yellow pages directories, their approaches to protection of factual compila-
tions have important ramifications for other types of compilations. The Feist
Court held that the arrangement of a typical white pages directory lacked the
necessary originality for copyright protection, see discussion supra part I.B., but
Feist's application to other factual compilations is unclear, see supra note 40
(discussing additional areas of factual compilations). Under the Copyright Act,
computer programs and databases are subject to copyright protection, see id.,
but the general format approach to the yellow pages would also undermine the
congressional intent to protect the arrangement of such databases.
Congress established the National Commission on New Technological Uses
of Copyrighted Works (commonly known as CONTU) to make recommendations
concerning copyright protection for computers, among other things. In re-
sponse to CONTU's recommendations, Congress amended sections of the Copy-
right Act to make provisions for copyright protection for computers. Sheils &
Penchina, supra note 13, at 570 n.60. In its report, CONTU described the pro-
tection that databases should receive:
The use of one item retrieved from [a database]-be it an address, a
chemical formula, or a citation to an article-would not under reason-
able circumstances merit the attention of the copyright proprietor. Nor
would it conceivably constitute infringement of copyright. The re-
trieval and reduplication of any substantial portion of a data base,
whether or not the individual data are in the public domain, would
likely constitute a duplication of the copyrighted element of a data base
and would be an infringement....
It appears that adequate legal protection for proprietary rights in
extracts from data bases exists under traditional copyright principles
as expressed in the new law .... The unauthorized taking of substan-
tial segments of a copyrighted data base should be considered infring-
ing, consistent with the case law developed from infringement of
copyright in various forms of directories.
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WoRnS 42 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT] (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
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Although appropriate from both a legal and a policy stand-
point, the Second Circuit's original elements test does present a
potential difficulty: courts may apply the test in an arbitrary
manner. It may be fairly simple to determine when a directory
contains an original selection or arrangement, but determining
whether a competing directory meets the "substantial similar-
ity" test for infringement may prove difficult.' 51 The court in
Key Publications illustrated two extremes: a directory that cop-
ied all of the headings and the businesses listed in another direc-
tory would clearly infringe the copyright, 152 but a directory
containing only three of the twenty-eight categories and only
seventeen percent of the same listings would not.153 The facts in
these examples made the decisions relatively easy, but it is diffi-
cult to know where courts should draw the line between in-
fringement and permitted duplication. Substantial similarity
could require duplication of half of the headings or duplication of
even ninety percent. If an individual changed one listing in a
factual compilation, the Key Publications analysis would not
preclude a finding of infringement, but if an individual changed
five percent of the listings, the analysis could preclude such a
finding.' 54 The Key Publications analysis does not provide clear
answers to these problems. 155 In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit
There is no indication in Feist that the Court intended to undermine pro-
tection for computer databases. Under the general format approach, legal
databases such as Westlaw and Lexis, which contain both copyrightable and
uncopyrightable information, would receive no copyright protection for their se-
lection and arrangement unless those aspects differed in some unusual way
from other databases; database users would be free to appropriate those aspects
of the database without regard to the arrangement or selection. Under the
proper standard of originality that Congress foresaw, however, a thoughtful se-
lection and arrangement should receive copyright protection, even if those as-
pects were not novel. See CONTU REPORT, supra, at 41-42. Additionally, the
user might be bound by a contractual agreement with the proprietor. See supra
note 13 (discussing other avenues of remedy besides copyright).
151. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the substantial
similarity test).
152. Key Publications v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., 945 F.2d
509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991).
153. See id. at 514-15 (describing the Galore directory).
154. The Key Publications court only held that a court may find infringe-
ment even without verbatim copying. The court did not explain, however, how
much a competitor's work must differ before it is no longer infringing. See id. at
514.
155. This lack of a precise standard might be a positive point, however.
Some commentators have argued that a case by case basis may be the best ap-
proach. See John P. MacDonald, Presentation of John P. MacDonald, Esq., 17
U. DAYTON L. REv. 539, 543-44 (1992). One commentator further argued that it
was "neither surprising nor unwise" for the Court in Feist to allow the extent of
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test has the advantage of certainty. 156 By simply denying copy-
right protection to virtually all "typical" yellow pages listings,
the Eleventh Circuit approach eliminates troublesome gray
areas.
Line drawing, however, is an unavoidable part of copyright
law. Drawing copyright lines, although sometimes difficult and
even arbitrary, is no more difficult in the case of factual compila-
tions than in music or drama. 157 "Nobody has ever been able to
fix that boundary [between infringement and permitted duplica-
tion], and nobody ever can."'15  The fact that the line will seem
arbitrary, however, "is no excuse for not drawing it."' 59
Courts can best deal with these problems by using the same
substantial similarity analysis that they use in other areas of
copyright law.160 Because the substantial similarity test is
based on the perspective of the average lay observer, 161 it makes
sense to apply the same standard in the case of yellow page di-
rectories, whose target audience is the average consumer.'6 2
The substantial similarity test for factual compilations, there-
fore, is whether an average lay observer would recognize the se-
lection, arrangement, or coordination of the alleged copy as
having been appropriated from the copyrighted directory. 63
Although this test is not numerically precise, it provides per-
copyright protection to evolve on a case by case basis. See Arthur R. Miller,
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Gener-
ated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARv. L. REV. 978, 1041
(1993).
156. See discussion supra part II.B.
157. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) (drawing lines
between musical selections); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d
49 (2d Cir.) (drawing lines between a book, a play, and a movie), cert. denied,
298 U.S. 669 (1936); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1930) (drawing lines between a play and a movie).
158. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (L. Hand, J.).
159. Id. at 122.
160. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.)
(comparing historical works), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980); Steinberg v. Co-
lumbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (comparing
illustrations).
161. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the substantial
similarity test).
162. Suits involving directories do not necessarily go to an actual jury of lay
observers, however. Feist, BellSouth, and Key Publications were all appeals
from grants of summary judgment. In ruling on summary judgment motions,
though, courts should use the standard of the average lay observer.
163. Cf Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966)
(articulating the "substantial similarity" test as "whether an average lay ob-
server would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the
copyrighted work").
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haps the best way to balance the Copyright Act's apparent ten-
sions.164 It provides protection for expression of the facts while
denying protection to the facts themselves.165
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court settled questions of copyright for white
pages directories in Feist, requiring that the directories contain
at least a minimal amount of originality. The decision did not,
however, answer the question of whether the selection or ar-
rangement of the elements of compilations such as yellow pages
directories could be sufficiently original to qualify for copyright
protection. There is some inconsistency among the circuit courts
concerning the required level of originality. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit, in BellSouth, interpreted Feist to hold that a yellow pages
directory would need to be different from a typical directory in
its organization and arrangement to qualify for copyright protec-
tion. The Second Circuit, by contrast, held in Key Publications
that even a typical yellow pages listing deserves copyright pro-
tection if there is creativity in the selection of businesses listed
and in the arrangement and coordination of the directory.
Although the distinctions will not always matter, in certain situ-
ations, the two approaches may lead to opposite results.
The Eleventh Circuit test has the effect of raising the re-
quired threshold of originality for compilations higher than the
Feist decision allows. The less stringent Second Circuit test in
Key Publications sets the threshold of originality at the level re-
quired by Feist. The Second Circuit test's requirement of line
drawing, though more difficult to implement, is similar to re-
quirements in other areas of copyright law. In dealing with
cases of copyright infringement of the yellow pages and other
factual compilations, therefore, courts should use the standard
of originality suggested in Key Publications and protect the se-
lection and arrangement of such compilations.
164. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (discussing the apparent
tensions in the Copyright Act).
165. See supra note 57 (discussing the balancing function of the substantial
similarity requirement).
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